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The interpretations of infants’ non-verbal responses in violation-of-expectation (VOE) false belief 
scenarios are subject to intense theoretical debate. In Experiment 1, adults provided online narratives 
for VOE scenarios meant to tap understanding of false beliefs about object location, perception and 
identity. Adults provided cognitively-oriented narratives for the location scenario when instructed to 
track beliefs and, for this scenario only, participants evaluated the unexpected outcome as unexpected 
and the expected outcome as expected. Adults had mixed views about the perception scenario, and 
judged the identity scenario where the agent acted in violation of his belief as being reasonable. 
Experiment 2 confirmed that when the identity scenario was turned into an action task that was time-
pressured, adults failed to act in a belief-based manner. We should be cautious in drawing firm 
conclusions about mentalizing in infancy when adults’ narratives and estimates of the expectedness of 
outcome events suggest that only certain VOE scenarios were interpreted in their intended fashion.           
 
 



















Decades of research on standard false belief tasks requiring verbal reasoning, indicate that theory-
of-mind (TOM; also referred to as mindreading) emerges in humans from about 4 years of age 
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). This basic developmental trend is illustrated in Wimmer and 
Perner’s (1983) object location false belief task, in which Maxi is shown storing his chocolate in a 
cupboard and leaving the scene. During Maxi’s absence, his mother transfers the chocolate to a table 
drawer. Children are directly asked to predict where Maxi will go to look for his chocolate. Most 3-
year-olds incorrectly answer that Maxi will look in the actual location rather than in the place he left 
it. From age 4, children typically arrive at the correct answer, appreciating that others may have false 
beliefs about an object’s location. From this age TOM is conceptually unified: the emerging 
understanding of belief includes not just the possibility for beliefs to misrepresent the world, but that 
people’s beliefs can be about specific aspects of things (Rakoczy, Bergfeld, Schwarz, & Fizke, 2015). 
The classical view is that there is deep conceptual change in children’s belief reasoning over the 
preschool years, and advances in language, executive function and participation in complex and 
diverse social interactions help children learn about subjective mental perspectives (Apperly, 2011; 
Low & Perner, 2012; Perner, 1991). 
A challenge to the conceptual shift account comes from research using the violation-of-expectation 
(VOE) technique where the amount of time infants look at different stimuli is measured. Onishi and 
Baillargeon (2005) showed 15-month-olds scenarios of an agent forming either a true belief or false 
belief about an object’s location. The agent was ultimately shown searching in the belief-compatible 
or the belief-incompatible location for the target object. Infants looked longer when the agent 
searched in a location that did not match her belief. Onishi and Baillargeon interpreted the longer 
looking as evidence of infants understanding that others act on the basis of their beliefs and that these 
beliefs are representations that may or may not correspond with reality.  
In a follow-up study, Song and Baillargeon (2008) showed 14.5-month-olds an event sequence 
where an agent displayed a preference to reach for a black skunk instead of a blue-haired doll (skunk 
condition; toys’ locations were counterbalanced). In the agent’s absence, the skunk was put into a 
plain box and the doll was put into a box which had a black tail attached to the inner edge of its lid. 
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The agent returned and was shown either reaching for the tail box or the plain box. Infants looked 
longer when the agent was shown reaching for the plain box, suggesting that 14.5-month-olds can 
track others’ false beliefs based on the way an object appears. Other studies suggest that infants can 
even causally and systematically reason about others’ beliefs. Scott and Baillargeon (2009) showed 
18-month-olds an agent who was presented with a 2-piece penguin toy and a solid penguin toy. The 
agent repeatedly took out a key and hid it inside the 2-piece toy. When the agent was away, the 2-
piece toy was assembled (to match the appearance of the one-piece penguin) and a transparent box 
was placed over it. An opaque box was placed over the indivisible toy so that the agent, on her return, 
would mistakenly believe that the observable penguin was the indivisible one. Then the agent, with 
key in hand, was shown to either reach for the transparent box or the opaque box. Infants looked 
longer when the agent reached for the transparent box than when the agent reached for the opaque 
box. The pattern of looking responses was taken to show that infants: inferred the agent’s goal of 
hiding the key in the divisible toy; attributed that the agent falsely believed that the toy in the 
transparent box was the indivisible toy (when it was really the divisible toy); falsely believed that the 
divisible toy was located in the opaque box (when it was really in the transparent box); and expected 
the agent to reach for the opaque box and were surprised when she reached for the transparent box.     
How can infants display sensitivity to others’ false beliefs when responding in some ways while 3-
year-olds treat false belief as impossible when responding to the very same situation in other ways? 
Baillargeon and colleagues (2010) explain that VOE techniques only tap the early developing 
psychological reasoning system and infants can simply express their abstract understanding of an 
agent’s mental states as they observe a scene unfold. By contrast, standard TOM tasks make demands 
on language and executive function skills that develop slowly toward the end of the preschool years. 
These additional demands mask 3-year-olds’ conceptual competency. There are, however, significant 
challenges to Baillargeon’s argument (Sodian, 2011, 2016). First, children’s executive function is 
correlated uniformly with performance on TOM tasks that impose high or low executive demands 
(Carlson, Claxton, & Moses, 2015). Moreover, preschoolers with a high level of executive function 
skills pass standard false belief tasks at the same time as their control counterparts (Sabbagh et al., 
2006). Second, infants’ responses to VOE tasks may just as well be explained by differential attention 
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to the perceptual novelty of certain test outcomes with respect to previously encoded events (Heyes, 
2014) or to the following of stimulus-response behavior rules (Ruffman, 2014). Finally, the combined 
evidence of success amongst infants in diverse VOE studies is largely based on data between age 
groups and between children, making it difficult to compare depth of understanding on indirect versus 
direct measures of false belief reasoning (Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016).  
VOE methodology is primarily designed to answer questions about infants’ basic sensory 
discriminations (Haith, 1998); higher-level explanations of how the unexpected and expected event 
sequences are meant to be interpreted in the VOE studies are provided by the researchers themselves.  
Scott and Baillargeon (2009) construe their VOE scenario as engaging infants’ understanding of false 
beliefs about object identity. Others disagree with the interpretation (e.g., Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; 
Fizke, Butterfill, & Rakoczy, 2013; Low, Apperly, Butterfill, & Rakoczy, 2016; Ruffman, 2014; 
Wellman, 2014; Zawidzki, 2013) and suggested that the scenario only taps tracking of others’ false 
beliefs involving the types of objects present and not object identity. An agent’s false belief over 
object identity, in the strict numerical sense, would result in mistakes involving expansion (agent 
thinks that there are two distinct objects when there is only one) or mistakes involving compression 
(agent thinks that there is only one object when there are two). Butterfill and Apperly argued that in 
the case of Scott and Baillargeon’s task, there were always two objects present on the stage (the 
divisible penguin and the indivisible penguin) and the agent possessed the same knowledge. Infants 
could have passed the task by tracking the agent’s false belief of the types of objects present: the 
object on that side is a divisible toy so the object on the other side is an indivisible toy.  
To shed light on the debate over the interpretation of infants’ performance in VOE studies, the 
current research asks whether adult participants would explain VOE event scenarios in the same way 
that was intended by the task developers themselves. If adults find it difficult to grasp the event 
sequences that make up complex VOE tasks, it would be difficult to sustain a rich mentalistic 
interpretation of infants’ looking behavior on the same tasks. In Experiment 1, we examined adults’ 
explanatory narrations for false belief VOE scenarios that have been used in three prominent infant 
studies. In Experiment 2, we measured adults’ non-verbal reaching actions to assess the construct 
validity a VOE scenario that has been suggested to involve false beliefs about object identity. 
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2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
 In Experiment 1 adults provided online narratives for three VOE films that have been suggested to 
involve an agent’s false belief about: object location (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), object perception 
(Song & Baillargeon, 2008) and object identity (Scott & Baillargeon, 2009). At the end of each film, 
participants saw either an expected ending (the agent acted in a way that was consistent with his false 
belief) or an unexpected ending (the agent acted in a way that was inconsistent with his false belief). 
We expected that adults would be able to explain and make sense of the object location and object 
perception false belief VOE scenarios, but that there would be ambiguity over the meaning of the 
object identity VOE scenario.    
We also compared adults’ narrations and judgments depending on whether participants were 
instructed to watch the VOE films freely, to track the objects in the films, or to track the beliefs or 
perspectives of the displayed agent. According to Apperly and Butterfill (2009), belief inferences 
make deep and lasting demands on executive resources, even in adults, and are not likely to be 
automatic. Moreover, belief inferences can be computationally intractable without constraints on 
which aspects of others’ situation might be relevant for interpreting or predicting their behaviors 
(Apperly, 2011). If it turns out that adults, from the start, are automatically set to make inferences 
about an agent’s belief, perspective or motivational state whenever they see an agent behave in some 
way, then adults’ narratives should make references to agents’ internal cognitions even when 
participants are not specifically instructed to track mental states. Following Apperly and Butterfill, 
however, we predicted that adults would only spontaneously make references to internal cognitions in 
their narratives when they were explicitly instructed to track others’ internal mental states.  
2.1.1. Participants 
A total of 72 adults (undergraduates: 17 males and 55 females) (M = 18.92 years; SD = 2.83; Range = 
17 to 40) participated in exchange for partial course credits. The sample size aligns with other studies 
that have examined adults’ narratives or verbal explanations of the reasons behind others’ actions 
(e.g., Abel, Happé, & Frith, 2000; Lagattuta, 2005; Lovett & Pillow, 2010). 
2.1.2. Materials  
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The object location film (Figure 1a) was adapted from the false belief green condition of Onishi 
and Baillargeon’s (2005) study. It started with a familiarization phase that comprised three trials. In 
trial 1, a watermelon toy was positioned on a table between a green box (agent’s left) and a yellow 
box (agent’s right). When the curtain was raised, the agent picked up the toy and placed it into the 
green box. In trials 2 and 3, when the curtain was raised, the agent placed his hand into the green box 
where the toy was located. In the belief-induction event, while the agent was away, the toy silently 
moved from the green box to the yellow box. For the expected ending, the agent acted in accordance 
with his false belief and reached into the green box where he thought the toy was located. For the 
unexpected outcome, the agent reached into the yellow box where the toy was really located.     
*** Figure 1 *** 
The object perception film (Figure 1b) was adapted from Song and Baillargeon’s (2008) false 
belief condition. There were four familiarization trials. For trials 1 and 2, the agent sat before a blue-
haired doll (on the agent’s right side) and a black skunk (on the agent’s left side). A disembodied hand 
entered the stage and placed the skunk on top of a mat, and the doll on top of another mat. The agent 
grabbed the skunk after the hand exited the stage. The sequence was the same for familiarization trials 
3 and 4, except that the skunk was on the agent’s right side and the doll was on the agent’s left side, 
and that the hand placed the toys on shallow containers. The belief-induction event was as follows. 
Whilst the agent was away, the stage floor presented two boxes: a plain box and a tail box (so-called 
because a skunk’s tail was attached to the inner edge of the box’s lid). A disembodied hand entered 
the stage and lifted the lid of the tail box five times and then lifted the lid of the plain box five times. 
Then the skunk appeared in front of the plain box and the doll appeared in front of the tail box. The 
disembodied hand entered the stage and deposited the doll into the tail box and the skunk into the 
plain box. For the expected outcome, when the curtain was raised, the agent acted in accordance with 
his false belief of the way things appeared and reached for the tail box. For the unexpected outcome, 
the agent reached for the plain box.    
The object identity film (Figure 1c) was adapted from Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) false belief 
condition. In familiarization trials 1 and 2, the agent faced two penguin toys, a divisible penguin (the 
head piece sat beside the body piece) and an indivisible penguin (solid toy). A disembodied hand 
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entered the stage, lifted the indivisible penguin by its head and placed it on top of a stand. Then the 
hand picked up the body piece of the divisible penguin and placed it on top of the other stand. The 
hand then picked up the head piece of the divisible penguin and placed it beside its body part on the 
stand. The agent then raised his right hand to reveal a key (he waved the key several times), placed the 
key into the body piece of the divisible penguin, and placed the head piece on top of the body piece 
(once assembled, the divisible type of toy looked like the indivisible type of toy). Familiarization 
trials 3 and 4 were the same except that the divisible penguin was on the agent’s left side and the 
indivisible penguin was on the agent’s right side, and that there were two trays instead of two stands. 
The belief-induction event was as follows. In the agent’s absence, the stage presented two boxes, one 
was transparent and the other was opaque. The divisible penguin sat in front of the transparent box 
whilst the indivisible penguin sat in front of the opaque box. A disembodied hand entered the stage 
and placed the indivisible penguin flush against the opaque box. The hand then placed the body of the 
divisible penguin flush against the transparent box and assembled the head piece on top of the body 
piece. The hand then covered the assembled divisible toy with the transparent box, and covered the 
indivisible toy with the opaque box. For the expected outcome, when the curtain was raised, the agent, 
reached for the opaque box, believing (according to Scott and Baillargeon’s rationale) that there was 
an indivisible toy underneath the transparent box. For the unexpected outcome, the agent reached for 
the transparent cover. The event components making up each film are in Supplementary Materials. 
2.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were individually tested in a quiet room. They all watched three types of false belief 
VOE films (order counterbalanced); half of them were exposed to scenarios with unexpected 
outcomes, and half to scenarios with expected outcomes. Participants were informed that that they 
would see three films whereupon they had to provide story narrations for each one. They were told 
that each film would be shown twice, with the second screening immediately following the first 
screening. They were told to use the first screening as a previewing opportunity to silently consider 
what they might say when story-narrating the film during the second viewing. Previewing event-based 
sequences assists story processing and encourages more story-like narratives (Shapiro & Hudson, 
1991) and does not diminish story engagement or enjoyment (Leavitt & Christenfeld, 2011). 
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Participants were assigned to receive one of three types of instructions: neutral, object tracking or 
mental state tracking. Participants in the neutral group were given the following instruction: “Your 
story narration should explain the events in the film to the best of your abilities.” Participants in the 
object tracking group were given the instruction: “Your story narration should explain the location of 
the toy or toys in the film to the best of your abilities.” Participants in the mental state tracking group 
were given the instruction: “Your story narration should explain the motives and beliefs or 
perspectives of the actors in the film to the best of your abilities.” The films were played on a 19-inch 
television and participants spoke into a microphone. In an exit questionnaire, participants responded 
to an open-ended question (“What did you make of the ending?”) regarding each film’s conclusion 
(they were prompted by still frames depicting the ending of each VOE scenario). 
2.2. Results and Discussion 
Analyses focused on the context of the narrative generated for the belief-induction event (scores 
ranged from 0 to 2) and the ending event (scores ranged from 0 to 2) of the different films. A score of 
0 was given if the participant offered no narration for the belief-induction or ending events, or was 
substantially off-topic. A score of 1 was given if the narrative for that event was purely descriptive in 
context. A score of 2 was given if the narrative included any cognitive information that made explicit 
reference to an internal mental state (see Supplementary Materials for examples). Two raters 
independently coded 25% of the narratives with 96% reliability, and one of the raters coded the 
remaining narratives alone. Summing across the belief-induction and ending events, each participant 
could, for each film scenario, receive a narrative context score that ranged from 0 to 4 points. The 
higher the context score, the more cognitively oriented the narrative produced. 
*** Table 1 *** 
Participants’ narrative context scores (means reported in Table 1) were submitted to a mixed 
model 3 (scenario: location, perception and identity) x 3 (instruction: neutral, object, or belief) x 2 
(outcome: unexpected or expected) ANOVA with scenario as a within-subjects variable and 
instruction and outcome as between-subjects variables. The 3-way scenario x instruction x outcome 
interaction was significant (F(4, 132) = 3.06, p = 0.019, ηp2 = 0.085). The 3-way interaction reflected 
the presence of 2-way interactions between instruction and outcome for the location scenario (F(2, 66) 
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= 4.00, p = 0.023, ηp2 = 0.108) and the perception scenario (F(2, 66) = 4.68, p = 0.013, ηp2 = 0.124). 
In the location scenario, and only with a belief-focused instruction, participants’ narrative of the 
unexpected outcome was more cognitively oriented than participants’ narrative of the expected 
outcome (F(1, 22) = 5.97, p = 0.023, ηp2 = 0.213). For the perception scenario, when given an object-
focused instruction, participants’ narrative context score for the expected outcome was higher than 
participants’ narrative context score for the unexpected outcome (F(1, 22) = 6.82, p = 0.016, ηp2 = 
0.237). The 2-way instruction by outcome interaction for the identity scenario was not significant 
(F(2, 66) = 0.04, p = 0.962); there was only a significant main effect of instruction (F(2, 66) = 8.57, p 
< 0.001, ηp2 = 0.206) whereby participants who received the belief-focused instruction demonstrated a 
higher narrative context score than participants who received the object-focused instruction. 
The narrative context scoring does not provide insight into what participants themselves think 
about the ending events of the VOE scenarios. Consider a participant who narrated the ending of the 
location scenario as, “And then it [the screen] opens, and the man reaches into the yellow box like he 
knew it had been moved.” Whilst the narration, in mentioning an internal mental state (i.e., “knew”), 
would receive a context score of 2 points, the statement does not illuminate whether or not 
participants themselves deemed the actor’s final action as being expected or unexpected, justified or 
not justified. We were able to gain better insight into participants’ judgments about the intelligibility 
of the various endings by analyzing their responses on the exit questionnaire. Participants’ judgments 
about the endings were coded as a category variable comprising of three levels: 0 = ending was 
deemed expected; 1 = ending was deemed unexpected; or 2 = don’t know or ambiguous response 
(examples are provided in Supplementary Materials). Two raters independently classified 25% of 
participants’ judgments with 92% reliability and one of the raters coded the remaining judgments 
alone. Loglinear analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between the categorical 
variables of instruction, outcome and own judgment. 
For the location scenario, parameter estimates from a loglinear analysis indicated that there was 
only a significant 2-way outcome by judgment interaction (Z = -5.27, p < 0.001, 95% CI = -2.32 to -
1.06). Regardless of instruction, a majority of participants who viewed the unexpected outcome 
themselves judged the ending as being unexpected (n = 29/36 = 81%) whilst all of the participants 
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who viewed the expected outcome themselves judged the ending as being expected (Χ2(2) = 68.11, p 
< 0.001). For the perception scenario, there was only a significant 2-way outcome x judgment 
interaction (Z = -2.38, p = 0.017, 95% CI = -0.89 to -0.09). Difference in Z-scores suggested that the 
outcome by judgment interaction effect was weaker for the perception scenario (|Z| = 2.38) than the 
location scenario (|Z| = 5.27). The lower Z-score of the outcome by judgment interaction for the 
perception scenario indicated that although a majority of participants who watched the expected 
outcome also judged the ending as being expected (31/36 = 86%), participants who viewed the 
unexpected outcome were divided as to whether they themselves judged the ending as being 
unexpected (n = 18/36 = 50%) or as being expected (n = 16/36 = 44%) (Χ2(2) = 15.50, p < 0.001). Of 
those 16 participants who judged the unexpected outcome of the perception scenario as being 
expected, 81% (n = 13) of them explained that the agent reaching for the plain box was a sensible 
thing to do because the tail box was too obvious a trick to fall for.  
For the identity scenario, parameter estimates indicated that there was only a main effect of own 
judgment (Z = 5.03, p < 0.001, 95% CI = 0.53 to 1.21) whereby more than half of the judgments about 
the ending were of the expected variety (n = 47/72 = 65%) (Χ2(2) = 34.75, p < 0.001). Indeed, many 
participants judged the ending of the identity scenario as being expected regardless of whether they 
were watching the expected outcome (n = 20/36 = 77%) or the unexpected outcome (n = 27/36 = 
75%). We further examined the ‘expected’ judgments offered by the 20 participants watching the 
expected outcome of the identity scenario: all of them made judgments based on the types of objects 
present rather than numerical identity (e.g., “Makes sense from what he experienced; there was 
always one doll without a lid on for him to put the key in, and he can see one of the dolls and it’s got 
its lid on”). Amongst the 27 participants who judged the unexpected outcome of the identity scenario 
as being ‘expected’, 25 of them (93%) reasoned that the ending was sensible because the agent was 
reaching towards a box where one could actually see something (e.g., “He chose that box because he 
can see what’s in it. I would probably choose the one that I could see what’s in there. It kind of makes 
sense that he’d go for that one, because you can see what’s in there”). 
Supporting our first hypothesis, adults perceived the event sequences of Onishi and Baillargeon’s 
(2005) VOE task to be meaningful. Supporting our second hypothesis, participants only 
 Adults’ VOE Interpretations       12 
 
 
spontaneously talked about the agent’s cognitive state in this scenario when they were instructed to 
generate narratives that explained the motives and beliefs or perspectives of actors in the film. Where 
direct judgments were concerned, participants regardless of instruction interpreted the unexpected 
outcome of the object location scenario as being unexpected and judged the expected outcome of the 
object location scenario was being expected.  
The results for the other VOE scenarios were less clear cut. Participants watching the expected 
outcome of the perception scenario generated narratives with higher context scores than compared to 
participants watching the unexpected outcome of the same scenario; this effect was observed when 
participants were instructed to focus on object whereabouts. An object-focused instruction may have 
motivated participants to pay more attention to the way that the tail box appears and the subjective 
reason for the agent selecting the tail box (with the undesired doll) rather than the plain box (with the 
desired skunk). However, whilst adults judged the expected outcome of the perception scenario as 
being expected, there was ambiguity over what was assumed to be an unexpected outcome. Adults 
were divided in their judgments about whether the unexpected outcome was expected or unexpected; 
many participants stated that it was logical for the agent to reach for the plain box as the tail box 
would be much too obvious a trick for someone to fall prey to.   
The majority of narratives generated for the identity scenario were merely descriptive and 
participants did not make explicit reference to the agent’s cognitive states, regardless of instruction 
manipulation. Surprisingly, the majority of adults viewing the unexpected outcome judged it as being 
expected; many stated that it was a reasonable thing to do, to reach for an object that one encounters 
in the transparent box rather than take a chance on something that may or may not be found 
underneath the opaque box. The most important finding, however, was that a majority of participants 
provided a converging explanation for why the agent reached for the opaque box: a divisible toy must 
be under the opaque box if the toy in the transparent box is an indivisible one. In this way, adult 
participants’ judgments align with Butterfill and Apperly’s (2013) minimalist interpretation of what 
Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) VOE task might be tapping into, that is, reasoning about types of 
object present rather than identity per se. In Experiment 2, we tested whether adults would 
conceivably reach for the transparent box if they happened to find themselves in the actor’s shoes. 
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3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Method 
The identity VOE scenario that participants passively watched in Experiment 1 was turned into an 
active participation task in Experiment 2. Across three familiarization trials, participants sat in front of 
an actor and observed the actor hide a key in the body of a divisible penguin toy. In the fourth 
familiarization trial, the actor left the scene and participants took on the role of the actor. Participants 
sat in the actor’s chair and also had to place the key inside the body of the divisible toy and then 
reassemble the toy. The innovative component to this experiment was measuring how participants 
would react in the ending phase when the blind was raised and participants were faced with a 
transparent box (containing an assembled divisible toy) and an opaque box (containing an indivisible 
toy). In Experiment 1, participants suggested that it would be reasonable for an agent to reach for the 
transparent box with the visible penguin, and that they would have acted similarly if they were in the 
same situation. According to Apperly and Butterfill (2009), our ability to track object encounterings 
imposes relatively fewer demands on general information processing resources compared to making 
attributions about object perceptions (and beliefs) as standardly conceived; minimal mindreading 
inferences are more likely to be deployed in time pressured situations where cognitively efficient 
responses are critical. For Experiment 2, then, we contrasted participants’ actions in a condition where 
there was urgency to the box selection as compared to a condition where there was no urgency. We 
hypothesized that there would be more first reaches to the transparent box when the task scenario was 
set in an urgent context than when the task was set in a non-urgent context. Analysis of response 
latencies can potentially illuminate the cognitive processes that underpin immediate actions (Atance, 
Bernstein, & Meltzoff, 2010; Edwards & Low, 2016). Following the view that attributing beliefs 
about objects, as compared to tracking encounterings of objects, is not automatic but imposes deep 
and lasting cognitive demands, we hypothesized that first reaches to the opaque box should be slower 
than first reaches to the transparent box. 
3.1.1. Participants 
A total of 32 adults (undergraduates) participated in exchange for partial course credits (8 males 
and 24 females; M = 19.22 years, SD = 2.04; range = 18 to 27). The sample size is in keeping with 
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other studies where adults’ reaching actions have been measured as a way of evaluating behavioral 
data from infants (e.g., Hespos, Gredebäck, von Hofsten, & Spelke, 2009). 
3.1.2. Procedure  
Participants were individually tested in a quiet laboratory. A hidden video camera was mounted on 
the ceiling and recorded hand movements on the stage. Each participant was randomly assigned to 
either the urgent or the non-urgent condition. In both conditions the experimenter provided the 
following instructions, “When this blind is raised, you will see an actor behind it. Please attend to 
everything that is happening in front of you, until I give you further instructions. It is important that 
you pay attention to what is happening, as later you will be asked to do something based on your 
observations.” The participant sat in front of the stage whilst the experimenter sat behind the 
participant. The blind was raised revealing an actor seated on the opposite side (facing participant) 
and familiarization trial 1 commenced (see Figure 2).  
*** Figure 2 *** 
In the urgent condition, a disembodied hand reached out from behind the side curtains with a key, 
placing it on the stage floor. The hand then brought out an indivisible penguin toy, and placed it on 
the left-side of the stage (the actor tracked all of the hand’s movements). The hand re-appeared from 
behind the curtain and placed the head, then the body of a divisible penguin toy on the right-side of 
the stage. Once the hand retracted, an alarm was set off. This was a loud civil defence siren with 
countdown effect, played through speakers hidden underneath the stage (see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMi_IJOsS1c). The aim was to contextualize the actor’s action 
as being time-pressured. A civil defence siren was appropriate to our testing environment as all of our 
participants live on an island nation that is a hot bed of seismic activity, and emergency sirens are 
treated as demanding rapid action. The actor quickly grabbed the key, placed it into the body of the 2-
piece penguin and placed the head back on. When the head of 2-piece penguin was placed back on, 
the alarm stopped. The blind then rolled back down marking the end of the trial. The sequence in 
familiarization trial 2 was similar to familiarization trial 1 except that the hand moved the divisible 
penguin first. The sequence in familiarization trial 3 was similar to familiarization trial 1 except that 
the divisible penguin was placed on the left-side of the stage. Before familiarization trial 4, the 
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experimenter gave the participant the following instructions, “Ok, now things are going to change. 
You’re going to take a turn playing the actor behind the blind and I’m going to take your role as the 
observer.” The experimenter brought the participant to the seat behind the stage (the actor by that time 
had left the scene) and said, “Remember you are now the actor and I’m the observer. Please act 
according to your previous observations.” The experimenter then sat down where the participant had 
been originally seated. At that point, the blind was raised for familiarization trial 4, whereupon the 
following were placed on the stage: the key (centre-stage), the indivisible penguin (right-side) and the 
pieces of the divisible penguin (left-side). The siren sounded after the hand exited from the stage. All 
participants responded by grabbing the key, placing it into the body of the divisible penguin, and 
reassembling its head; at that point the siren alarm stopped and the blind was lowered. Across 
familiarization trials 1 to 3, the alarm could go off 3 seconds, 5 seconds or 9 seconds after the hand 
left the stage (timings across the four versions of the familiarization phase were: 3s-5s-9s or 5s-3s-9s 
or 9s-3s-5s or 9s-5s-3s). For familiarization trial 4, the alarm went off 7 seconds after the hand exited 
from the stage.  
The test trial directly followed the familiarization phase. While the blind was lowered, occluding 
the participant’s view (participant still acting as agent), the experimenter silently assembled the pieces 
of the divisible penguin on the left-side of the stage, and placed a transparent box over it. The 
experimenter placed the indivisible penguin toy on the right-side of the stage, and placed an opaque 
box over it (sides counterbalanced). The key was placed between the two boxes, then the screen was 
raised and the siren was immediately triggered. The variable of interest was the box that the 
participant-agent first touched or reached for. As in the familiarization trials, the siren was only 
deactivated when the participant inserted the key into the divisible penguin and reassembled it. At the 
end of the experiment, participants were asked to explain why they reached first for a particular box. 
In the non-urgent condition, instead of a civil defence alarm being triggered, a non-emergency 
sound was used: a hotel call bell was tapped from behind the curtains, producing a single ding sound. 
The non-urgent condition was exactly the same as the urgent condition in all other respects. 
3.2. Results and Discussion 
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There was a significant association between first reach and condition, Χ2(1) = 12.52, p < .001. In 
the non-urgent condition, all 16 participants first reached for the opaque box, whereas in the urgent 
condition, only 7 did so (44%). In terms of explanations, almost two-thirds of the participants in the 
non-urgent condition (10/16) reasoned about object types (e.g., “that one [in transparent box] looked 
like it was solid and didn’t have like a lid and I just assumed that [in opaque box] would be set up like 
previously”). The remaining 6 participants in the non-urgent condition could not explain their first 
reach decision. Of the 9 participants in the urgent condition who first reached for the transparent box, 
6 of them offered justifications involving the transparency of the box and being able to encounter an 
object there (e.g., “probably just because it was clear so I could see something in there”). The 
remaining 3 participants could not explain their initial action. Amongst the 7 participants in the urgent 
condition who first reached for the opaque box, 5 of them offered justifications involving object types 
(e.g., “I knew that this [in transparent box] was closed and I didn’t know this one [in opaque box] 
would be closed so I just opened it assuming it would be open”). The remaining 2 participants could 
not explain their initial action (for response examples see Supplementary Materials). 
We also calculated the amount of time (in milliseconds) it took each participant to make a first 
reach to the edge of either box from the onset of the sound cue (videos at 30 frames per second were 
played back on a frame-by-frame basis). One participant’s response was removed from analysis in the 
non-urgent condition as their latency was 3 standard deviations above the condition mean. A 2 
(condition: urgent or non-urgent) x 2 (first box reach: transparent or opaque) between-subjects 
ANOVA was not performed as there were no first-reaches to the transparent box in the non-urgent 
condition. There was a main effect of condition on latency of first reach, F(1, 29) = 5.42, p = 0.027, 
ηp2 = 0.157; participants in the urgent condition were faster to execute a first reach to a box (M = 
2941.67 milliseconds; SD = 2038.32; SEM = 509.58; n = 16) than participants in the non-urgent 
condition (M = 5848.89 milliseconds; SD = 4535.20; SEM = 1170.98; n = 15). The main effect of first 
box reach on latency just reached significance, F(1, 29) = 4.17, p = 0.05, ηp2 = .126. First reach was 
faster to the transparent box (M = 2318.52 milliseconds; SD = 1110.44; SEM = 370.15; n = 9) than to 
the opaque box (M = 5178.79 milliseconds; SD = 4103.37; SEM = 874.84; n = 22). 
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To summarize, our hypotheses were supported. First, in the non-urgent situation all first reaches 
were to the opaque box whereas in the urgent situation, many participants reached first to the 
transparent box. This suggests that adults tend to use rudimentary mindreading inferences in an urgent 
situation when an efficient decision has to be made about the types of object present. Second, latency 
analyses revealed that first reach in the urgent condition was faster than first reach in the non-urgent 
condition and, further, that first reach to the transparent box was faster than first reach to the opaque 
box. The response latencies fit with Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) broader theorizing that 
representing mental states as such is associated with deep and lasting demands on general cognitive 
resources in adults, and is incompatible with notions that human beings are (automatically) set to 
engage in abstract psychological reasoning.   
4. General Discussion 
The classical view of conceptual change in preschoolers’ belief understanding is facing significant 
and increasing challenge from VOE-based studies showing that infants, in their looking-time 
expectations, are sensitive to others’ false beliefs in a range of situations. The problem is that, whilst 
measuring indirect behavior has led to impressive advances in the TOM field (Baillargeon et al., 
2010), looking-time data alone cannot definitively answer the question of whether indirect responses 
are driven by an understanding of belief as such, statistical learning, perceptual novelty, or perhaps 
some tracking of rudimentary belief-like states (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Heyes, 2014; Ruffman, 
2014). Moreover, researchers are divided about which aspect of representational understanding certain 
VOE scenarios might be tapping into (e.g., false belief about object identity or false belief about 
object types – Scott & Baillargeon, 2009 versus Butterfill & Apperly, 2013). New insights into the 
development and cognitive processes of belief reasoning can be gained by going beyond infants’ and 
preschoolers’ task performances to consider the mature mindreading system that children grow into 
(Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2009). In order to advance theoretical understanding of how VOE 
data should be considered, we sought to provide complementary evidence of how mature mindreaders 
would interpret the plot of VOE tasks.  
Experiment 1 revealed that adults perceived the plot of Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) VOE task 
to be meaningful. Adults spontaneously (when motivated with the belief instruction) provided 
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cognitively-oriented narratives to explain the unexpected outcome event sequence. Regardless of how 
adults narrated the event sequences, the majority of participants judged the unexpected outcome as 
being unexpected and the expected outcome as being expected. Adults were divided in their views of 
the event sequence adapted from Song and Baillargeon’s (2008) VOE task. Participants clearly judged 
the expected outcome to be expected (referring to the agent’s internal perceptions and cognitions over 
the tail box) but unexpected outcome judgments were mixed. These findings underscore Apperly’s 
(2011) important point about how mental states have tenuous, holistically mediated relations to 
behavior and it can be challenging to constrain which aspects of an agent’s situation may be relevant 
for interpreting his or her behavior.  
Adults’ narratives and judgments over Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) identity task are especially 
relevant in highlighting that researchers’ own interpretations about where it makes sense for an agent 
to look are only obvious given a host of background or taken-for-granted assumptions. There were 
three key findings. First, this VOE scenario was the most challenging for participants to provide 
narrations for. Participants simply described the actions and did not make reference to internal 
cognitions, regardless of whether or not they were told to track beliefs. Second, participants judged 
the unexpected outcome as being expected, perceiving that it was reasonable for the agent to reach 
first for something that was being encountered rather than taking a chance on something that was not 
encountered. Third, even amongst participants who judged the expected outcome as being expected, 
the explanations revolved around the agent making a decision based on the types of objects present 
rather than on numerical identity per se. Our findings indicate that, at least from the mouths of adults, 
Scott and Baillargeon’s VOE scenario taps reasoning about object types rather than identity (Butterfill 
& Apperly, 2013).      
Experiment 2 reinforced the findings of Experiment 1: adults were more likely (and faster) to make 
a non-belief-based action and reach first for the transparent box where there was an object 
encountered, when the task was embedded in an urgent context as compared to a non-urgent context. 
If adults are not set to engage in abstract belief-based reasoning either when observing or participating 
in Scott and Baillargeon’s VOE scenario, why might 18-month-olds look longer at the unexpected 
outcome compared to the expected outcome? One explanation could partly involve the fact that in the 
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familiarization trials, infants never saw the agent reach for or place a key inside the indivisible 
penguin. When the agent reached for the indivisible penguin at the test phase, infants’ surprise may be 
due to the first occurrence of this novel agent-object relation (Heyes, 2014; Ruffman, 2014). Given 
that adults do ordinarily frame Scott and Baillargeon’s VOE scenario in terms of sophisticated 
inferences involving misrepresentations over how a particular object is experienced, researchers 
should be cautious in drawing firm conclusions that infants are processing VOE scenarios in terms of 
abstract representations of mental states as such. On a positive note, our findings suggest that there is 
at least construct validity in the object location false belief VOE event sequence as compared to other 
more complex scenarios.         
Our findings also connect with literature that speaks to the cognitive basis of human mindreading 
more generally. In Experiment 1, adults only spontaneously included inferences about others’ mental 
states when they were instructed to consider other agents’ beliefs. These results complement work by 
Apperly and colleagues’ (2006) showing that false beliefs are not ascribed automatically. The case for 
non-automaticity of belief reasoning is also supported by the latency findings from Experiment 2 
showing that incorrect first reach actions (actual location of the target) are faster than correct first 
reach actions (believed location of the target). If, as popularly assumed, adults (and infants and 
preschoolers) are from the start set to infer and put to use attributions about belief as such, correct 
responses should be faster (Perner & Roessler, 2012). It is reassuring that adults’ latency data 
dovetailed with Atance et al.’s (2010) analysis of 3-year-olds’ answer latencies on a battery of 
standard false belief tasks; the latency of young preschoolers’ incorrect false belief answering were 
also faster than their correct latencies. Our findings, highlighting the non-automaticity of belief 
reasoning, when coupled with other evidence documenting that some mindreading situations are 
solved in a relatively automatic fashion (e.g., Van der Wel, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2014), could suggest 
that mature mindreading involves multiple systems for tracking mental states with complementary 
trade-offs between efficiency and flexibility (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low et al., 2016).  
Researchers use the VOE paradigm to measure non-verbal (implicit) reasoning but Experiment 1 
was limited to assaying participants’ verbal (explicit) reasoning. Our approach is a necessary step 
towards breaking the interpretation deadlock facing VOE research. Adults’ interpretations of the 
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meaning behind VOE event sequences and their judgments about what information may (or may not) 
be relevant to explaining action outcomes can partly help contextualize infants’ understanding of the 
same stimuli, so we may better theorize about where development occurs and how. We addressed the 
limitation of Experiment 1 to some extent by measuring adults’ non-verbal (reaching) responses in 
Experiment 2, and adults’ actions dovetailed with adults’ narratives about certain VOE event 
sequences. Nevertheless, future research could measure the amount of time adults spend looking at 
different VOE outcomes in false belief, true belief and ignorance conditions (see Silva, Ten Hope, & 
Tucker, 2014, for methodological suggestions), to gauge the degree of continuity between infants’ and 
adults’ mindreading ability. Examination of adults’ looking responses on VOE tasks could even 
provide data on the extent to which adults track the agent’s belief even when they were not instructed 
to do so (e.g., Schneider, Nott, & Dux, 2014). It will also be worthwhile to recruit a larger sample size 
to run our instruction manipulation as a within-subjects factor and, in so doing, profile individual 
differences in mindreading (e.g., Bukowski & Samson, 2017; Dodell-Feder, Lincoln, Coulson, & 
Hooker, 2013) that relate to when adults track or fail to track mental states in their verbal and non-
verbal responses. 
Our current findings offer up an important piece of practical advice: given partisan debates over 
how VOE tasks and data are to be interpreted, it would be theoretically informative for future VOE 
studies to compare and contrast infants’ performance alongside adults’ performance. Points of 
convergence and divergence between infants’ and adults’ reasoning can ultimately help specify the 
combination of cognitive systems, representations and processes that guide human mindreading.  
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Fig. 1.  Film stills from the (a) object location, (b) object perception and (c) object identity 
false belief scenarios, showing the familiarization events, the belief-induction events 
and the ending events (where the outcome is either expected E+ or unexpected E-).  
 





Fig. 2.  Film stills showing the familiarization and test phases of the identity scenario in 
Experiment 2. In familiarization trial 1, the participant (seated at top) passively 
watched the sequence of events: the hand placed the key on the stage, followed by the 
indivisible toy and the divisible toy, and then the actor-agent placed the key into the 
divisible toy and assembled it to deactivate the siren alarm. In familiarization trial 4, 
the participant (seated at bottom) actively played the role of the actor-agent, and 
placed the key inside the divisible toy and assembled it to deactivate the siren. In the 
test phase, the blind was pulled up and the siren was immediately triggered whilst the 
participant (seated at bottom) was confronted with a transparent box (containing the 
assembled divisible toy) and an opaque box (containing the indivisible toy). In this 
example, the participant first reached to the transparent box.   
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Table 1. Mean narrative context scores (with standard deviation and standard error of mean) 
for the different VOE scenarios by instruction and outcome shown. 
Scenario  Instruction Outcome       Mean (SD; SEM) 
    
Location Neutral Unexpected       2.33  (0.78; 0.22) 
  Expected       2.25  (0.45; 0.13) 
    
 Object Unexpected       1.92  (0.29; 0.08) 
  Expected       2.17  (0.39; 0.11) 
    
 Belief Unexpected       3.08  (0.67; 0.19)  * 
  Expected       2.42  (0.67; 0.19) 
    
    
Perception Neutral Unexpected       2.08  (0.29; 0.08) 
  Expected       2.58  (0.90; 0.26) 
    
 Object Unexpected       1.83  (0.39; 0.11)  * 
  Expected       2.42  (0.67; 0.19)    
    
 Belief Unexpected       3.17  (0.83; 0.24) 
  Expected       2.67  (0.78; 0.22) 
    
    
Identity  Neutral Unexpected       2.08  (0.29; 0.08) 
  Expected       2.25  (0.62; 0.18) 
    
 Object Unexpected       1.83  (0.39; 0.11) 
  Expected       1.92  (0.29; 0.08) 
    
 Belief Unexpected       2.50  (0.80; 0.23) 
       Expected  2.67  (0.89; 0.26) 
    
 
Note: *p = 0.02 
 
 
